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Confiança empresarial nos mercados emergentes: o efeito moderador sobre a relação entre instituições e a 
corrupção no México e o Peru 
Resumo
Palavras-chave: corrupção, confiança, instituições, teoria baseada em recursos.
As empresas nos mercados emergentes enfrentam frequentemente à corrupção e fraqueza institucional em seu ambiente. A con-
fiança empresarial pode contribuir com esses desafios. Nos mercados emergentes, a confiança empresarial pode envolver aos fun-
cionários e reduzir a pressão sobre as empresas, pelas debilidades institucionais. Este artigo apresenta um estudo com funcionários 
do México e do Peru que mensura suas percepções de corrupção, confiança, e força institucional. Por meio de analise fatorial confir-
matória e regressão linear, investiga-se como a confiança modera a relação entre a fraqueza institucional e a corrupção percebidas. 
Os resultados sugerem que a confiança empresarial motiva aos funcionários a ser produtivos e que as empresas que geram confiança 
podem lidar melhor com os desafios dos ambientes institucionais corruptos.
Keywords: corruption, trust, institutions, resource-based view.
Las empresas en mercados emergentes se enfrentan frecuentemente a la corrupción y debilidad institucional en su entorno. La 
confianza empresarial puede ayudar con estos desafíos. En mercados emergentes, la confianza empresarial puede involucrar a los 
empleados y reducir la presión sobre las empresas, causada por debilidades institucionales. El presente es un estudio con empleados 
de México y Perú que mide sus percepciones de corrupción, confianza y fortaleza institucional. Por medio de análisis factorial 
confirmatorio y regresión lineal, se investiga cómo la confianza modera la relación entre la debilidad institucional y la corrupción 
percibidas. Los resultados sugieren que la confianza empresarial motiva a los empleados a ser productivos, y que las empresas que 
generan confianza pueden enfrentar mejor los desafíos de entornos institucionales corruptos.
Confianza empresarial en mercados emergentes: el efecto moderador sobre la relación entre instituciones y 
corrupción en México y Perú 
Abstract
Palabras clave: corrupción, confianza, instituciones, teoría basada en recursos.
Emerging market firms often face corruption and institutional weakness in their environments. Firm-level trust may help with these 
challenges. In these countries, firm-level trust may engage employees and reduce pressure on firms from weak institutions and 
corruption. This is a study of employees of firms in Mexico and Peru, and it measures perceptions of corruption, trust, and institutional 
strength. Using confirmatory factor analysis and linear regression, the study tests hypotheses that trust moderates the weak institution 
- perceived corruption relationship. Findings suggest that trust may help employees be productive despite these challenges. Firms 
that build trust among employees may be better able to confront the challenges of corrupt and uncertain institutional environments.
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1. Introduction
Firms operating in developed and emerging markets 
face the reality of corruption (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 
2008; Ionescu, 2013). Corruption occurs in all countries, 
but it presents special challenges to firms in emerging 
market countries (Transparency International, 2016; Bohn, 
2013). Complicating the issue is corruption’s influence that 
weakens already weak public institutions (Morris, 2009). 
Despite efforts in many emerging market countries to 
reform governments and strengthen institutions, corruption 
remains high in most of them (Transparency International, 
2016). For example, in several Latin American countries, 
reforms have strengthened many public institutions, but 
rankings and scores on the Corruption Perception Index 
have not improved and many have worsened (Transparency 
International, 2016). 
Corruption presents challenges to firms operating in 
emerging market countries, most of which prefer to engage 
in fair competition rather than corruption (Ciravegna, Lopez 
& Kundu, 2016). Firms in emerging markets generally 
prefer to avoid engaging in corruption, knowing that if they 
act corruptly, they damage their brand, alienate customers, 
and lose the support of their local communities (Schaefer 
& Schaefer, 2008). Emerging market firms instead want 
to achieve competitive advantages by building resources 
and capabilities, such as competitive pricing, innovation, 
distribution expertise, and by creating loyal, trusting, and 
trustworthy staff (Brenes, Haar, & Requena, 2009; Haar & 
Price, 2008). We argue that this last resource, the level of 
trust in the firm held by its staff, is a valuable capability. 
Furthermore, in highly corrupt countries, firm-level trust by 
employees engages them in ways that counter the external 
pressure placed on firms by public level corruption.
We ask the question, “How does firm-level trust by 
employees help emerging market firms mitigate the 
challenge of public level corruption?” The idea may seem 
counterintuitive: corruption is a dishonest and immoral 
behavior, while trust evokes honesty and a high level of 
morality. We argue that as firms that operate in corrupt 
environments build resources and capabilities to compete 
amid the uncertainty that corruption brings, firm-level 
trust is a very important resource. When employees trust 
the firm’s priorities, and see that achieving those priorities 
leads to individual and team goals, the firm is better aligned 
to succeed (Brenes, Mena, & Molina, 2008).
This research on firm-level trust deepens understanding 
about the institutional strength - corruption relationship in 
emerging markets. We hypothesize that firm-level trust 
is a key variable that moderates the relationship between 
institutional strength and perceived corruption, such that 
when people have a high level of trust in the companies 
they work for, they will find corruption to be less strongly 
associated with weak public institutions. Conversely, 
when people have low trust in the companies they work 
for, corruption will be more strongly associated with weak 
institutions. While past studies have examined the effect of 
public sector trust, or generalized trust, on corruption (Li & 
Wu, 2010; Uslaner, 2013), which is generally negative, our 
study is unique because it examines how firm-level trust, or 
particularized trust (Uslaner, 2004), may influence people’s 
perceptions of their public institutions and corruption. 
This underexplored area of study makes three 
contributions to the corruption literature. First, our 
conceptual model expands existing research on corruption, 
suggesting that firm-level trust moderates the long held and 
oft-replicated relationship between weak public institutions 
and perceived corruption. We surveyed employees of firms 
in Mexico and Peru, measuring perceptions of corruption, 
trust, and institutional strength. Using confirmatory factor 
analysis and linear regression, we test these main effects, 
and we broaden our scope to test how employee’s firm level 
trust moderates that relationship. 
Second, we draw from the resource-based view of the 
firm (Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011; Liu, 2012) to posit 
that firm-level trust is a resource and capability that 
increases employees’ positive engagement in the firm’s 
agenda, particularly in uncertain, corrupt institutional 
environments. Our contribution lies in empirically 
demonstrating that employees’ trust in the firm, a valuable 
resource, moderates the weak institution – perceived 
corruption relationship. 
Third, to our knowledge, no studies have examined the 
firm-level trust - corruption relationship, although some 
have explored the relationship between people’s trust in 
their public institutions and perceptions of corruption. Our 
study does this, by examining this particularized level of 
trust that individuals in emerging market countries have in 
the firms they work for and its influence on their perceptions 
of corruption. By adding this important social variable, 
firm-level trust, to the study of perceived corruption, 
we begin to fill the gap that some scholars have recently 
called for (Bjornskov, 2011; Husted, 2002; Peña López & 
Santos, 2014). Together with work focusing on corruption 
in emerging economies, this study provides local and 
multinational corporation managers with new knowledge 
on how firm-level trust might help firms perform effectively 
and successfully in situations of high perceived corruption. 
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses; section 3 explains 
the methods used to analyze empirically the weak institution 
– perceived corruption relationship and the moderating 
effects of firm-level trust; section 4 discusses the results; 
and finally, section 5 offers conclusions, recommendations 
for practice and research, and limitations.
2. Theoretical framework
 2.1. Corruption
“Corruption is the abuse of public power for private 
gain” (Lambsdorff, 2007, p.1). It occurs when people with 
discretionary power over public resources intentionally 
misdirect those resources or pervert organizational routines 
to their benefit (Jain, 2001; Lange, 2008). Corruption is that 
exercised by people in governmental institutions, because 
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1993, p.1133). Trust mitigates risk between one person and 
another: suggesting that I am vulnerable, you know that I 
am vulnerable, but I trust that you will not act upon that 
vulnerability. Put another way, trust is “the willingness of 
a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another…based 
on the expectation that the other will [act]… irrespective of 
the ability to monitor or control [them]” (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995, p.712). 
“Trust helps people believe that other people are still 
part of their moral community” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 153), 
making it easier to deal with them. Trust is built by past 
cultural and educational experiences, which influence how 
we trust other people and organizations. For example, 
when people trust those who are similar to themselves, it 
is because they think they know others in their group, such 
as people belonging to a religion (Parboteeah, Hoegl & 
Cullen, 2008), family, or workplace. This trust can translate 
to firms creating reliance and voluntary duty accepted by 
those engaged in the firm (Hosmer, 1995), and may help 
build intra-firm innovation and entrepreneurship (Childers 
& Offstein, 2007).
Firm-level trust, then, is a resource that can contribute 
to a firm’s competitive advantage. The resource-based view 
(RBV) suggests that a firm’s resources and capabilities, 
obtained by either buying or building them, are a source of 
competitive advantage (Barney et al., 2011; Lin & Wu, 2014). 
Capabilities that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and 
non-substitutable can create superior performance and 
competitive advantage (Barney et al., 2011). Capabilities 
are combinations of financial, physical, human, and 
organizational resources. Interestingly, the more intangible 
those resources are, the harder it is for competitors to 
acquire or imitate them, and the more likely the firm will 
sustain its competitive advantage. 
Firm-level trust is an intangible resource that builds 
employee engagement (Hough, Green, & Plumlee, 
2015; Malinen, Wright, & Cammock, 2013), employee 
commitment (Baek & Jung, 2015), and helps employees 
confidently transfer knowledge to their colleagues (Droege, 
Anderson, & Bowler, 2003; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapiencza, 
2001). Those attributes are capabilities that could be a 
source of competitive advantage because they are hard to 
imitate, hard to substitute, and differentiate firms from their 
competitors (Barney et al., 2011). Firms that generate the 
dynamic capability of firm-level trust may deal better with 
environmental uncertainty (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; 
Kanter, 1988), such as that found in emerging markets with 
weak institutions. Firms operating in countries with weak 
institutions must use creativity, flexibility, and constant 
adjustment to survive, and firm-level trust may be a 
resource that builds the capabilities to accomplish this. 
For example, employees who trust their firms will focus 
on the productive tasks needed to add value to the firm 
(Mayer & Gavin, 2005), rather than be concerned about 
how weak institutions and corruption might threaten their 
work. Employees become engaged, and will spend time 
and energy on value-producing activities, taking innovative, 
calculated risks, instead of worrying about what the firm 
they have the power to arrest, imprison, charge, collect 
taxes from, and levy official power against, citizens and 
private firms in a way that non-governmental actors do not. 
Corruption occurs to some degree in every country, per 
the corruption perception indices tracked by Transparency 
International (2016) and the World Bank (2016). Predictably, 
corruption generally has a negative effect. Corruption may 
lower national productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003); discourage 
investment by foreign and domestic firms (Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Zhao, Kim, & Du, 
2003); reduce confidence in public institutions (Berrios, 
2010; Mocan, 2008); limit the development of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, weaken systems of public 
financial management, and undermine investments in 
health and education (Rose-Ackerman, 2002). Emerging 
market countries moving toward a free-market economy 
(Kvint, 2009) are particularly vulnerable to corruption, 
because their public institutions are often weaker 
(O’Higgins, 2006) and more corrupt (Arvate, Curi, Rocha, 
& Miessi Sanches, 2010; Mocan, 2008; Morris, 2009; Park, 
2003; Venard, 2009; Morris & Klesner, 2010). Corruption 
feeds a vicious circle of negative outcomes where increased 
corruption produces less confidence in institutions, which 
in turn reduces private investment, slows economic growth, 
increases government outlays that favor the rich and well-
connected, then leads to poor public infrastructure, and 
limits the ability of people and business to build sustainable 
incomes (O’Higgins, 2006). 
2.2. Institutions and corruption
One theory of corruption suggests that individual 
attributes, such as a lack of integrity, moral identity, self-
control, empathy, or psychopathology (Ashforth, Gioia, 
Robinson, & Trevino, 2008; Klitgaard, 1988) drive corrupt 
behavior. Corruption, then, is controlled by weeding out 
people with low moral character and discouraging them 
from acting on that character. 
However, we argue in this paper that corruption is 
also institutional. Weak public institutions create a fertile 
environment for corruption (Morris, 2009; Schaefer & 
Schaefer, 2008), and in emerging market economies, 
forces larger than individual greed can drive corruption. 
Weak institutions result in a lack of transparency, lack of 
oversight, and uneven enforcement of policies, and these 
too are linked to higher incidences of corruption (Blake & 
Morris, 2009; Venard, 2009). Much of this research affirms 
the positive relationship between corruption and these 
weak institutions: namely, economic climate (Ahlin & 
Pang, 2008; Altunbas & Thornton, 2012; Fisman & Gatti, 
2002; Rose-Ackermann, 2002), legal system (Rodriguez & 
Ehrichs, 2007), physical infrastructure (Huff & Kelley, 2005), 
and public safety (Lambsdorff, 2007; Price, 2008). 
2.3. Firm-level trust 
Trust is the “mutual confidence that no party to an 
exchange will exploit another’s vulnerabilities” (Sabel, 
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might do that could adversely affect them. In this way, an 
employee who trusts the firm and its management may 
take risks and be willing to admit to a mistake if it happens, 
helping to mitigate damage and conserve resources. When 
trust is high, employees spend less time in self-protection 
and devote more cognitive resources to valuable, productive 
work (Mayer & Gavin, 2005) and to the other people they 
work with (Vanhala, Puumalainen, & Blomqvist, 2011). Thus, 
firm-level trust is a resource that can build valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable capabilities (Malinen et 
al., 2013).
2.4. Economic climate, corruption, and firm-level trust
Recent studies on corruption reveal that a country’s 
economic climate, including its macro-economic policies 
such as inflation, exchange rates, and taxation (Altunbas 
& Thornton, 2012), is related to corruption. Countries 
with strong economic growth and prosperity have open 
markets, strong monetary policies, and rigorous financial 
oversight, which contribute to strong financial institutions 
and lower corruption (Rivera-Batiz, 2001; Venard, 2009; 
Wurgler, 2000). Conversely, a weak economic climate is 
associated with high levels of corruption because it creates 
uncertainty for foreign investors, which reduces foreign 
direct investment (Treisman, 2007), discourages capital 
flow, and impedes economic growth (World Bank, 2016). 
Thus, many studies suggest a positive relationship between 
a weak economic climate and high perceived corruption 
(Ahlin & Pang, 2008; Altunbas & Thornton, 2012; Fisman & 
Gatti, 2002; Rose-Ackermann, 2002). 
Yet, in an environment where the economic climate is 
weak and perceived corruption is high, employees who 
have high levels of trust in the firms they work for will see 
the economic climate - corruption relationship as weaker, 
compared with employees with low firm-level trust. This 
is because high firm-level trust prevents employees 
from yielding to the challenges of the weak economy that 
their firm operates in. Indeed, employees with high firm-
level trust believe that trust helps protect them from the 
negative impacts of a weak economic climate on the firm. 
Employees with high firm-level trust are likely to observe 
little corruption and internal strife within their firms, and 
therefore they find corruption to be less closely coupled 
with the weak economic climate that exists outside the firm. 
Conversely, if employees have low trust in their firms, 
they may think there is little difference between the 
environment in their company and the environment of 
public institutions (Bailey & Paras, 2006). Their firms may 
seem just as uncertain as external public institutions, and 
they are more likely to think that corruption, which they see 
both inside and outside of their firms, is a function of the 
weak economic climate that surrounds them. Following 
these two arguments, we propose: 
• H1a: a weak economic climate is positively related to 
perceived corruption.
• H1b: firm-level trust moderates the positive relationship 
between a weak economic climate and perceived corruption.
2.5. Legal system, corruption, and firm-level trust
A country’s legal system is also related to corruption, 
beginning with a strong legal system contributing positively 
to the reliability of the business environment (Scott, 1995). 
Countries with strong laws protect contractual interests 
and private property, limit state interference in private 
sector affairs, and have courts that rule efficiently on those 
laws (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Lehnert, Benmamoun, & 
Zhao, 2013; North, 1991; Zhao et al., 2003). Kimbro (2002) 
found the stronger the legal systems, the less the perceived 
corruption in 61 countries. Conversely, weak legal systems 
beget weak administrative processes that encourage 
corruption. For example, civil servants may use their 
positions to extract bribes from companies in exchange for 
services. Due to weak legal recourse, this corrupt behavior 
may go unpunished, fostering more corruption (Rodriguez 
& Ehrichs, 2007). 
In countries where the legal system is weak, employees 
who have high firm-level trust will find the legal system 
- corruption relationship to be weaker, compared with 
people who have low firm-level trust. In organizations 
where firm-level trust is high, people may be assured that 
the policies and procedures that they experience internally 
extend to how the firm behaves, even in a weak legal 
environment. Employees will trust that their firms are not 
above the law, and that firms will comport themselves in 
ways that are honest, legal, and moral, remaining separate 
from the threats and distractions of a challenging legal 
environment. Employees with high firm-level trust are 
likely to observe honest and legal behavior from managers 
and subordinates in the firm, concluding that corruption, 
while it exists outside the firm, is not closely coupled with 
a weak legal system. However, employees who have low 
trust in their firms may experience dishonest behavior in 
the firm, and conclude there is little difference between the 
corruption they see inside and outside their firms (Hatak, 
Fink, & Frank, 2015). Low trust may convince them that 
their firms and public institutions are equally corrupt, 
thereby associating corruption with the weak legal and 
moral behavior that surrounds them. Based on these two 
arguments, we pose: 
• H2a: a weak legal system is positively related to perceived 
corruption.
• H2b: firm-level trust moderates the positive relationship 
between a weak legal system and perceived corruption.
2.6. Physical infrastructure, corruption, and firm-level trust
Physical infrastructure, such as highways, roads, bridges, 
sanitation, airports, and schools, represents an important 
public institutional force that is associated with corruption. 
A robust physical infrastructure signals a government’s 
vitality and investment priorities. The stronger the public 
infrastructure, the more attractive a community is to 
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people and firms; likewise, a weak physical infrastructure 
discourages foreign investment and diminishes social and 
economic activity (Porter, 1990). 
Infrastructure has a direct impact on people’s lives. A 
new school in an area that had none, or expanding a bus 
system, gives people access to education and saves them 
time. Therefore, weak physical infrastructure is a failure of 
the government to meet people’s needs. If infrastructure is 
weak, it suggests that public officials ignore public interest 
goals, perhaps to favor self-interest and personal financial 
incentives, such as kickbacks, and people associate it with 
corruption. 
Yet trust can change that association. Where perceived 
corruption is high and physical infrastructure is weak, 
people who have high levels of trust in the firms they work 
for will perceive the physical infrastructure - corruption 
relationship to be weaker. Employees who have high 
firm-level trust are likely to think that physical and other 
conditions in which they work are positive, surmising that 
the firm takes care of them in a way that prevents them 
from being distracted by weak physical infrastructure 
outside the firm. People who have high firm-level trust think 
their firms have found ways to overcome the problems that 
result in poor or unattended infrastructure, because those 
kinds of conditions do not exist in their firms. In fact, high 
firm-level trust suggests there is limited or no corruption 
in the firm, so people believe corruption is not as strongly 
associated with the country’s weak physical infrastructure. 
On the other hand, if employees have low trust in 
their firms, they may find conditions such as the physical 
underpinnings of their firm to be less favorable. They 
may believe there is little difference between the weak 
infrastructure they see both outside and inside their firms 
(Huff & Kelley, 2005). As such, they may find their firms are 
as inept and corrupt as those public institutions that failed 
to make the needed improvements on public infrastructure, 
and conclude that corruption is related to weak physical 
infrastructure. Based on these arguments, we pose two 
related hypotheses: 
• H3a: weak physical infrastructure is positively related to 
perceived corruption.
• H3b: firm-level trust moderates the positive relationship 
between weak physical infrastructure and perceived 
corruption.
 2.7. Public safety, corruption, and firm-level trust
Public safety is strong when law enforcement officials 
apply laws fairly and equitably (Davis, 2006). Public law 
enforcement, through robust public safety systems create 
stronger and more reliable environments and that help 
business growth by deterring crime, discouraging bribes, 
punishing impunity, and enforcing laws impartially. It 
follows, then, that strong public safety institutions reduce 
the opportunity and motive for corruption (Davis, 2006). 
Indeed, studies have shown that corruption is more 
prevalent in places where the application of law is weak 
(Lambsdorff, 2007; North, 1991) and where those who 
enforce public safety rules are compromised (Herzfeld & 
Weiss, 2003; Price, 2008). 
In places where public safety is weak, corruption is 
perceived to be high; however, if employees have high 
levels of trust in the firms they work for, they will perceive 
the public safety - corruption relationship to be weaker, 
when compared with those who have low firm-level trust. 
Employees who have high firm-level trust are more likely 
to believe that the firms they work for will protect them 
from the threats and distractions of corrupt public safety 
officials, despite the fact that their firms operate within that 
context of public safety corruption. High firm-level trust 
may allow employees to believe that they are protected 
from many possible instances of impunity or overt abuse 
of law enforcement power that could occur, because the 
firm itself is trustworthy, even if that impunity is rampant 
outside the firm. High firm-level trust suggests that 
employees probably experience little or no abuse of power 
by authorities within the firm, and that trust may suggest 
that the corruption that exists in the broader, institutional 
environment is not as strongly connected with weakness 
in the public safety authority. However, if employees 
experience low trust in the firms they work for, they may 
find abuses of power within their firms, and find little 
difference between abuses in their companies and impunity 
demonstrated by public safety institutions (Peña López & 
Santos, 2014). Because they see corruption and abuse in 
their firms, they are more likely to expect corruption to be 
associated with abuse and poor public safety enforcement. 
For these reasons, we pose these hypotheses: 
• H4a: weak public safety is positively related to perceived 
corruption.
• H4b: firm-level trust moderates the positive relationship 
between weak public safety and perceived corruption.
Figure 1 offers a graphic representation of the conceptual 
model and the related hypotheses discussed above. It also 
shows the hypothesized directions of the relationships that 
we later test.
Figure 1. Theoretical model: firm-level trust as a resource and corruption
Source: own elaboration.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Data collection and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we first measured the main 
effects of the four institutional variables – economic climate, 
legal system, physical infrastructure, and public safety – on 
perceived corruption. Then, we test the moderating effects 
of firm-level trust on the relationship between the four 
institutional variables and perceived corruption, similar to 
Tan and Lim’s (2009) test of the mediating effect of firm-level 
trust on the coworker trust and organizational commitment 
and performance relationship. We used confirmatory factor 
analysis and linear regression for our tests, and we describe 
our methods in detail below. Our methodology is unique 
because it captures the relationships among individuals’ 
perceptions of corruption, institutional weakness, and 
trust, which is different from the analysis of country-level 
data derived from publicly available data sets (Li & Wu, 
2010). Accordingly, the level of analysis is the individual and 
their perceptions of public sector corruption, the strength 
of public institutions, and firm-level trust. 
We administered surveys to approximately 550 
managerial level, working professionals enrolled in 
graduate and executive business education studies at 
universities in Mexico and Peru in late 2012. We selected 
Mexico and Peru because both countries are emerging 
markets that in the last two decades, underwent significant 
institutional reforms to make them more stable and 
economically viable (Ciravegna et al., 2016). In addition, 
and despite these reforms, both countries continue to 
experience significant, increasing levels of corruption. 
According to Transparency International (2016), the latest 
available at this writing, Mexico’s ranking on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) worsened, moving from 89 in 
2009, to 123 in 2016, suggesting corruption has increased 
in recent years. Peru’s CPI suggests it has experienced 
a similar increase in corruption over time, as its ranking 
moved from 75 in 2009, to 101 in 2016. Table 1 illustrates 
this and other related indices as a point of reference.
Table 1. Corruption perceptions indices, rankings, and scores of Mexico 
and Peru
Year Mexico Peru
Score 2012 34 38
(Higher score = 
less corruption)
2015 35 36
2016 30 35
Ranking 2009 89 75
(Closer to 1 = 
less corruption)
2012 105 83
2016 123 101
Source: Transparency International (2016).
Recognizing that this was a convenient sample, 
a descriptive analysis indicates that the sample is 
representative of a broad based industry and employment 
level. The sample of individuals we surveyed included 
owners, CEOs, presidents, general managers, directors, 
supervisors and employees. It reflects a population of 
active and engaged business professionals, and is stratified 
enough to present an array of individual-level perceptions 
about corruption, public institutional strength, and firm-
level trust. We received 548 responses and due to missing 
data, 318 were usable: 93 of the subjects were from Mexico, 
and 225 were from Peru. The average age was 38, with 
41% female and 59% male. We controlled for education, 
with 14% of the respondents having an undergraduate 
degree and 86% holding a post-bachelor degree. Nearly 
45% of respondents were associated with a family-owned 
business. We also controlled for position within the firm 
and industry. Finally, we measured firm size by the number 
of employees (avg. = 4622.59, s.d., 28260.54). As a result, we 
believe this sample adequately represents a cross section 
of business and managerial participants. Table 2 highlights 
the independent and dependent variables descriptive 
statistics and correlations. Table 3 highlights the control 
variables’ descriptive information, including percentages.
3.2. Measures, scale development and reliability
Most studies of corruption do not measure actual 
corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), because corruption is 
difficult to measure, illegal, and a socially unacceptable 
behavior. Therefore, researchers often use a proxy variable 
“perception of corruption” (e.g., Transparency International, 
2016), measuring instead multiple dimensions of 
respondents’ experience with corruption. Similarly, we 
asked respondents for their perceptions about corruption 
experiences their firms, and firms like theirs, face. 
Using a seven-point Likert scale, respondents answered 
42 questions comprising eight subscales: corruption, 
economic climate, legal system, physical infrastructure, 
public safety, and firm-level trust. We adapted our 
questions about institutions and corruption from Venard 
(2009). Questions about corruption include “Firms like mine 
must make extra, unofficial payments to public officials to 
obtain licenses and permits”; and “Firms like mine must 
make extra, unofficial payments to public officials when 
dealing with courts”. Questions for institutions include 
“Infrastructure (telephone, electricity, water, roads, land) is 
problematic for the operation and growth of firms like mine” 
for physical infrastructure; and “Inflation is problematic for 
the operation and growth of firms like mine” for economic 
climate. We adapted firm-level trust questions from 
Gillespie (2003) and Mayer and Davis (1999). Questions 
measuring trust include “There is a very high level of trust 
throughout my firm”, and “I am willing to depend on my 
firm to back me up in difficult situations”. Control variables 
were age, gender, education, employment status, family 
own a business, years’ experience, managerial position, 
size of firm, and industry, and descriptions, shown on table 
3. With the exception of age and years’ experience, each 
control was a categorical variable where subjects would 
select one of the control options. For example, responses 
in the “other” category reflected small numbers of non-
supervisory employees for the organizational position 
variable, and fewer than four responses in other industry 
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segments for the industry variable. We then applied these 
as dummy control variables within the regression. 
Native Spanish speakers translated and back translated 
the surveys. Common methods variance that is a result of the 
measurement rather than the construct they measure, is a 
potential problem (Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). To mitigate 
common methods variance, verify our constructs, and verify 
cross-cultural invariance between the two-country sample, 
we followed Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998). Cross-
cultural invariance was achieved by constraining no less 
than two items between the two samples. This produced a 
non-significant comparison between nested models (Chi-
square difference = 20.72, df = 13; p > 0.05), allowing us to 
combine the samples. The final constrained nested model 
still shows adequate fit (RMSEA = 0.05; CFI = 0.90).
We ran tests of convergent and discriminant validity 
utilizing Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) average variance 
extracted and composite reliability measures. Composite 
reliability is an alternative and stronger form of reliability 
than Chronbach alpha using the average variance extracted 
(AVE) compared to measurement error within the model. 
Utilizing confirmatory factor analysis, we verified all 
constructs. Convergent validity of all items loading on 
each construct was above recommended levels for scalar 
reliability. All scales showed sufficient reliability with 
loadings greater than the recommended 0.6 (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). These results confirm both discriminant and 
convergent validity of the scale measures, and reliability 
within each measure.
Following Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 
(2006), we used linear regression analysis to test the 
hypotheses. Analysis on the variance of inflations (VIF) 
indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue, as all non-
interactive term values are below 5 as recommended by 
Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1985). 
4. Results 
We used stepwise linear regressions to test our 
hypotheses. Table 4 tests the first hypothesis relating to 
corruption. For each model, we controlled for age, gender, 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations – independent/dependent variables
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Corruption 4.86 2.01 1.000 -0.086 -0.097* -0.001 0.030 0.289** 0.159**
2. Firm-level trust 3.30 1.08 1.000 -0.157*** -0.259*** -0.123** -0.170***
3. Weak economic climate 3.88 1.84 1.000 0.094** 0.515** 0.673**
4. Weak legal system 2.61 1.16 1.000 0.108* 0.123*
5. Weak physical 
infrastructure
3.30 1.66 1.000 0.595**
6. Weak public safety 2.77 1.70 1.00
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
Model control dummy variables include: age, gender, education, employment status, family owned business, years’ experience, managerial position, 
size of firm, industry.
Source: own elaboration.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for control variables
  Count % Mean s.d.
Gender 0.41 0.49
Female 130 41
Male 188 59
Age 38.18 9.63
Years’ experience     15.11 9.19
Education  0.87 0.34
Undergraduate 44 13.8
Post-graduate 274 86.2
 
Employment status 315 99 0.99 0.08
Family owned-business 0.46 0.50
Family owned-business (Yes) 144 45.3
Family owned-business (No) 174 54.7
 
Organizational position
CEO/President 40 12.6
Managerial level 155 48.7
Non-managerial 83 26.1
Other 40 12.6
Industry 
Banking/finance 27 8.5
Chemicals 4 1.2
Construction 14 4.4
Consumer goods 16 5
Education 30 9.4
Energy 25 7.9
Engineering 9 2.9
Food 8 2.6
Health 21 6.7
IT/telecommunications 17 5.3
Manufacturing 27 8.5
Non-profit 5 1.5
Public administration 28 8.8
Real estate 4 1.2
Transportation/logistics 4 1.2
Other 79 24.9
* Average size of firm: 4,622.59 empl/ 28,260.54 s.d.
Source: own elaboration.
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education, employment status, family owned business, 
years’ experience, managerial position, size of firm, and 
industry; however, due to space considerations we only 
present the independent and dependent variables. Model 1 
on table 4 shows the effects of firm-level trust on corruption 
(β=-0.07, p = 0.24), reflecting the argument that the trust 
– corruption relationship is more complex than the simple 
direct effect. Subsequent models build upon the direct 
effect, highlighting each institutional variable relationship 
to corruption, followed by the interactive effect of that 
institutional construct with firm-level trust.
Model 2 shows the results of the main effects of all 
four institutional pillars - economic climate, legal system, 
physical infrastructure, and public crime - on corruption. 
While the Beta (βWeak Institutional Climate=-0.27, p < 0.01) is 
significant, the negative sign does not support H1a, which 
states a weak economic climate is positively related to 
corruption. There was no significant direct effect of weak 
legal systems, (βWeak Legal System=-0.05, p = 0.72), thereby 
providing no support for H2a. Regarding the relationship 
between weak physical infrastructure and corruption, we 
find a strong positive effect (βWeak Physical Infrastructure=0.35, p 
< 0.00) that supports H3a. This implies that the weaker 
the physical infrastructure, the greater the perception of 
corruption. Results slightly support H4a because weak 
public safety is positively related to corruption (βWeak Public 
Safety=0.14, p < 0.08). As people perceive weakness in their 
country’s public safety, they perceive greater corruption. 
We offer a robust analysis of these results in the conclusion 
section that follows.
We then modeled each hypothesis separately, highlighting 
the interactive effect alongside our main effects. Model 
3 shows that the interaction between the weak economic 
climate and firm-level trust is not significant (βWeak Institutional 
Climate x Trust = -0.12, p = 0.54), thereby not supporting H1b. 
Model 4 indicates there is a significant interaction between 
weak legal systems and firm-level trust (βWeak Legal Systems x Trust 
= -0.43, p < 0.01) providing support for H2b. Graphing this 
interaction indicates that as firm-level trust increases, weak 
legal systems have less of an effect upon corruption. Model 
5 also demonstrates a significant interaction between weak 
physical infrastructure and corruption (βWeak Physical Infrastructure x 
Trust = -0.38, p < 0.01), providing support for H3b. Graphing 
this interaction highlights a similar effect as with the weak 
legal systems. Trust serves as a suppressing component, 
where higher levels of trust accentuate the effect of weak 
physical infrastructure on corruption. Model 6 shows a 
slightly significant interaction between weak public safety 
and firm-level trust (β = -0.32, p < 0.09), providing some 
support for H4b. Graphing this interaction indicates that as 
firm-level trust increases, the relationship between weak 
public safety and corruption is less positive. The graphs in 
figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate these moderating relationships. 
In the following section, we expand upon these results, and 
offer explanations for them. 
Table 4. Institutional – corruption relationship and moderating effects of trust
Corruption Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Firm level trust -0.07
(1.18)
0.05
(0.814)
0.02
(0.18)
0.22†
(1.84)
0.16
(1.33)
0.18
(1.0)
Weak economic climate -0.27**
(-3.48)
-0.17
(-0.89)
-0.28**
(-3.59)
-0.28**
(-0.353)
-0.27**
(-3.42)
Weak economic climate x trust -0.12
(-0.61)
Weak legal system -0.05
(-0.809)
-0.04
(-0.77)
0.34*
(2.08)
-0.03
(-0.587)
-0.04
(0.60)
Weak legal system x trust -0.43**
(-2.5)
Weak physical infrastructure 0.35**
(5.08)
0.35**
(5.04)
0.36**
(5.29)
0.68**
(3.75)
0.35**
(5.12)
Weak physical infrastructure x trust -0.38**
(1.96)
Weak public safety 0.14†
(1.75)
0.14†
(1.69)
0.15†
(1.86)
0.14†
(1.69)
0.43*
(2.28)
Weak public safety x trust -0.32†
(-1.70)
N 318 318 318 318 318 318
Model F statistics 1.33 2.64** 2.57** 0.281** 0.271** 0.267**
Model R2 0.106 0.216 0.215 0.234 0.227 0.224
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.135 0.133 0.151 0.143 0.140
R2 Change‡ 0.0 0.110 0.001 0.016 0.008 0.005
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.08
Numbers in parenthesis represent t-statistic.
‡R2 Change reflects change from model 1 and preceding model. 
Model control dummy variables include: age, gender, education, employment status, family owned business, years’ experience, managerial position, 
size of firm, industry. 
Source: own elaboration.
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Figure 2. Moderating effect of firm-level trust x weak legal system.
Source: own elaboration.
Figure 3. Moderating effect of firm-level trust x weak physical 
infrastructure.
Source: own elaboration.
Figure 4. Moderating effect of firm-level trust x weak public safety.
Source: own elaboration.
5. Conclusions
The results of our study partially confirm prior results that 
a weak public institutional environment is positively related to 
perceived corruption. We found that the relationship between 
two of the four institutional variables and corruption is 
positive: both weak physical infrastructure and weak public 
safety are associated with greater perceived corruption. 
More interestingly, however, firm-level trust moderates 
three of the four relationships. The higher the trust in the 
firms individuals work for, the less positively they perceive 
the relationship between corruption and a weak legal 
system (H2b), weak physical infrastructure (H3b), and weak 
public safety (H4b). While a weak legal system shows no 
significant relationship to corruption, as firm-level trust 
increases, weakness in the legal system is significantly less 
related to perceived corruption. 
Results also indicated interactions between trust and 
legal systems, trust and physical infrastructure, and to a 
lesser extent trust and public safety, such that the more 
people trust in the firms they work for, the less strongly they 
perceived weaknesses in legal systems, infrastructure, and 
safety to be associated with corruption. One might think 
that people who have high firm-level trust would attribute 
weakness in their public institutions to corruption, but this 
was not the case. So, why did this trust, which suggests 
a lesser degree of corruption in the firms people work 
for, reduce the positive relationship between weak public 
institutions and perceptions of corruption?
As we proposed, firm-level trust acts as a strategic 
capability that instills employee confidence in managers 
and managerial decision-making. Corruption is a 
challenge to firms in any country, and studies confirm 
that most firms prefer to engage in fair competition rather 
than corruption (Ciravegna et al., 2016). Leaders of firms 
seem to understand that if they yield to corruption, they 
risk damaging their brand, alienating their customers, 
and losing support of the communities that support them 
(Schaefer & Schaefer, 2008). Firms prefer to operate by 
leveraging their competitive advantages that may include 
the valuable resource of a loyal, trusting, and trustworthy 
staff (Brenes et al., 2009; Haar & Price, 2008). High firm-
level trust among employees is one mechanism that 
encourages employees to engage with the firm that 
counters the external pressure placed on firms by weak 
public institutions and corruption. 
Trust implies that parties to an exchange will not exploit 
the other’s vulnerabilities (Sabel, 1993), suggesting that trust 
is the absence of corruption. While public sector corruption 
may be significant, firm-level trust permits employees to 
believe that the firm and its leaders serve as a buffer from 
the negative effects of corruption. Trust enables employees 
to work effectively, despite the chaos external corruption 
may present. In uncertain environments where corruption 
is high, firms need additional creativity and flexibility to be 
successful and firm-level trust may encourage that kind of 
behavior from employees. 
It is important to highlight that people who have high 
firm-level trust still understand that public, institutional 
corruption exists. The difference is that they associate 
weakness in public institutions significantly less to that 
of corruption. These findings suggest that high firm-level 
trust shields them from the threats of a weak external 
environment, and that corruption, found outside of their 
trusted, inner circle, will not cause the firms they work 
for to collapse under the pressures of hostile strangers 
(Uslaner, 2004; 2013) found in weak public institutions. 
Indeed, this does not mean that high firm-level trust 
begets employees with false expectations about corruption 
outside the firm: these employees are not unaware. They 
know their public institutions are weak, and that corruption 
exists (Bohn, 2013). By building employees’ particularized 
trust in the firm, managers do not lull them into believing 
that the firm is immune or insulated from corruption. 
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Rather, the trust helps employees realize the limits of their 
public institutions and strategically rely on the resources 
of their particularized, in-group institutions to be more 
effective (Uslaner, 2013). Note that trust did not significantly 
moderate the economic climate-corruption relationship. 
Perhaps people feel the effects of a weak economic climate 
more directly, such that the high firm-level trust they 
experience in their organizations fails to protect them from 
its negative effects.
Our study revealed that firm-level trust may serve as 
a powerful resource. Future research might replicate our 
study in other countries, examine cross-national differences, 
and collect longitudinal data to examine possible causal 
relationships among the variables. Studies using data from 
more persons in the firm and over several points in time, 
might test the effect of firm-level trust on public policy, 
and examine possible spillover effects of micro- or firm-
level trust on macro- or public institutional trust. Another 
research avenue might examine if the national business 
environment affects strategic interventions at firm level by 
testing how the strength, or weakness, of the four national 
institutional pillars affects the relationship between 
organizational structure and firm-level trust in firms. 
Our study has a few limitations. First, this is a two-country 
sample, and while there may be similar relationships 
between institutions and corruption elsewhere, these 
results may not extend to situations in other countries. 
Future research might test the hypotheses in advanced 
or industrialized countries, to determine if there are 
differences compared with those of emerging markets. 
Second, we studied correlations among the institutional 
variables, corruption, and firm-level trust, but we do not 
claim causal effects. Our dataset is cross-sectional, and 
a longitudinal analysis is required to extract any causality 
among the strength of the institutional variables, trust 
and the perception of corruption. Data from a larger 
number of individuals in each firm would also provide a 
more generalized basis of analysis. Third, given the risk 
of common methods biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003), there 
are challenges resulting from construct creation and 
sample selection. However, we mitigated these biases by 
conducting convergent and discriminant validity testing 
across sample populations, and by using multiple sample 
populations in different countries (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; 
Conway & Lance, 2010).
In conclusion, practicing managers may find these results 
valuable. Business transactions require trust (Jarrat & 
Ceric, 2015), or a “fidelity with regard to promises” (Hume, 
1978/1739, p. 546). The business environment comprises a 
range of institutions that may raise, or raze, trust among 
those who play within it. While people hope that public 
institutions, such as courts and law enforcement, are 
not corrupt, they often are. So other institutions that do 
build trust, such as civic groups, trade associations and 
private-sector firms, help market transactions succeed by 
creating trustworthy relationships, spreading information 
about those with poor reputations, and sometimes 
blacklisting corrupt actors. McMillan (2002) notes that 
trustworthy firms complement weak institutional systems 
by compelling people to keep their word. The resource-
based view suggests that managers of firms, including 
those operating in uncertain and corrupt environments, 
might use firm-level trust to develop a unique capability 
(Galunic & Rodan, 1998). When firm-level trust is high, so 
is employees’ ability to focus attention on the strategic and 
tactical work to be done. Managers who create high firm-
level trust among employees, particularly in situations 
of uncertainty, may find that trust increases employees’ 
engagement in the firm (Malinen et al., 2013). Since trust is 
critical for enhancing the relationships inside and outside 
the firm, and for coordinating complex activities across the 
firm, the firm may leverage this internal trust to achieve its 
strategic goals. When employees trust the firm, they trust 
management will make decisions that are good for the firm 
and its stakeholders. This moderating effect of trust does 
not create complacent employees: employees are well 
aware that external institutional corruption exists. Trust 
may, however, allow employees to concentrate on their 
tasks and challenges at work (Mayer & Gavin, 2005), not be 
distracted by external institutional weaknesses, and to feel 
confident that larger, firm-wide strategic challenges, which 
may include threats of corruption, are being managed 
competently. 
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
Ahlin, C., & Pang, J. (2008). Are financial development and corruption 
control substitutes in promoting growth? Journal of Development 
Economics, 86, 414-433. 
Altunbaş, Y., & Thornton, J. (2012). Does financial development reduce 
corruption? Economics Letters, 114(2), 221-223.
Arvate, P. R., Curi, A. Z., Rocha, F., & Miessi Sanches, F. A. (2010). 
Corruption and the size of government: Causality tests for OECD and 
Latin American countries. Applied Economics Letters,  17(10), 1013-
1017.
Ashforth, B. E., Gioia, D. A., Robinson, S. L., & Trevino, L. K. (2008). 
Re-viewing organizational corruption.  Academy of Management 
Review, 33(3), 670-684.
Baek, Y.M., & Jung, C.S. (2015). Focusing the mediating role of institutional 
trust: How does interpersonal trust promote organizational 
commitment? Social Science Journal, 52(4), 481-489.
Bailey, J., & Paras, P. (2006). Perceptions and attitudes about corruption 
and democracy in Mexico. Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 22(1), 
57-82.
Barney, J., Ketchen Jr., D. J., & Wright, M. (2011). The future of resource-
based theory: Revitalization or decline? Journal of Management, 
37(5), 1299-1315.
Berrios, R. (2010). Corruption as a drag on development. Latin American 
Research Review, 45(2), 245-252. 
Bjornskov, C. (2011). Combating corruption: On the interplay between 
institutional quality and social trust. The Journal of Law & Economics, 
54(1), 135-159. 
Blake, C. H., & Morris, S. D. (2009). Political and analytical challenges 
of corruption in Latin America. In C. H. Blake & S. D. Morris (Eds.), 
Corruption and democracy in Latin America (1-24). Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Bohn, S. R. (2013). Corruption in Latin America: Understanding the 
Sánchez et al. / Estudios Gerenciales vol. 34, N° 147, 2018, 127-138 137
perception-exposure gap.  Journal of Politics in Latin America,  4(3), 
67-95.
Brenes, E. R., Haar, J., & Requena, B. (2009). Latin America: Environmental 
and firm-level challenges. Journal of Business Research, 62, 849-853. 
Brenes, E. R., Mena, M., & Molina, G. E. (2008). Key success factors 
for strategy implementation in Latin America. Journal of Business 
Research, 61, 590–598. 
Chang, S. J., Van Witteloostuijn, A., & Eden, L. (2010). From the editors: 
Common method variance in international business research. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41(2), 178-184.
Childers, J. S., & Offstein, E. (2007). Building entrepreneurial e-commerce 
competitive advantage: A blending of theory and practice. Advances 
in Competitiveness Research, 15(1), 41-53.
Ciravegna, L., Lopez, L. E., & Kundu, S. K. (2016). The internationalization 
of Latin American enterprises—Empirical and theoretical 
perspectives. Journal of Business Research, 69(6), 1957-1962. 
Conway, J. M., & Lance, C. E. (2010). What reviewers should expect 
from authors regarding common method bias in organizational 
research. Journal of Business and Psychology, 25(3), 325-334.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). Who cares about corruption?  Journal of 
International Business Studies, 37(6), 807-822.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Corruption in international business. Journal 
of World Business, 51, 35-49.
Davis, D. E. (2006). Undermining the rule of law: Democratization and 
the dark side of police reform in Mexico. Latin American Politics and 
Society, 48(1), 55-86.
Droege, S. B., Anderson, J. R., & Bowler, M. (2003). Trust and organizational 
information flow. Journal of Business and Management, 9(1), 45-59.
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence 
across countries. Journal of Public Economics, 83, 325-345.
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. (1981). Structural equation models with 
unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 18(1), 39-50.
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. 
New York: Free Press.
Galunic, C., & Rodan, S. (1998). Resource recombinations in the firm: 
Knowledge structures and the potential for Schumpeterian 
innovation. Strategic Management Journal, 19(21), 1193-1201.
Gillespie, N. (2003). Measuring trust in working relationships: The behavioral 
trust inventory. Paper presented at the 5th Australian Industrial 
Organizational Psychology Conference, Melbourne, Australia. 
Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. (2002). Corruption and foreign direct 
investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2), 291-307.
Haar, J. & Price, J. (2008). Can Latin America compete? Confronting the 
challenges of globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. 
(2006). Multivariate data analysis (6th ed.). Uppersaddle River: 
Pearson Prentice Hall.
Hatak, I., Fink, M., & Frank, H. (2015). Business freedom, corruption 
and the performance of trusting cooperation partners: Empirical 
findings from six European countries. Review of Managerial Science, 
9, 523–547
Herzfeld, T., & Weiss, C. (2003). Corruption and legal (in) effectiveness: 
An empirical investigation. European Journal of Political Economy, 
19(3), 621–632. 
Hosmer, L.T. (1995). Trust: The connecting link between organizational 
theory and philosophical ethics. Academy of Management Review, 
20(2), 379-403.
Hough, D., Green, K., & Plumlee, G. (2015). Impact of ethics environment 
and organizational trust on employee engagement. Journal of Legal, 
Ethical & Regulatory Issues, 18(3), 45-62.
Hume, D. (1978[1739]). A treatise of human nature (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.
Huff, L., & Kelley, L. (2005). Is collectivism a liability? The impact of 
culture on organizational trust and customer orientation: A seven-
nation study. Journal of Business Research, 58, 96-102. 
Husted, B. W. (2002). Culture and international anti-corruption 
agreements in Latin America. Journal of Business Ethics, 37(4), 413-
422. 
Ionescu, L. (2013). Perceptions of corruption in emerging 
economies. Economics, Management and Financial Markets, 8(1), 136.
Jain, A. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 
71-121.
Jarratt, D., & Ceric, A. (2015). The complexity of trust in business 
collaborations. Australasian Marketing Journal (AMJ), 23(1), 2-12.
Kanter, R. M. (1988). When a thousand flowers bloom. In B. M. Staw & L. 
L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, 10,169-211. 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Kimbro, M. B. (2002). A cross-country empirical investigation of 
corruption and its relationship to economic, cultural, and monitoring 
institutions. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 17(4), 325-
350. 
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Kvint, V. (2009). The global emerging market: Strategic management and 
economics. New York, London: Routledge.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003). How corruption affects productivity. Kyklos, 
56(4), 457-474.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007). The institutional economics of corruption and 
reform. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Lange, D. (2008). A multidimensional conceptualization of organizational 
corruption control. Academy of Management Review, 33(3), 710-729.
Lehnert, K., Benmamoun, M., & Zhao, H. (2013). FDI inflow and human 
development: Analysis of FDI’s impact on host countries’ social 
welfare and infrastructure. Thunderbird International Business 
Review, 55(3), 285-298.
Li, S., & Wu, J. (2010). Why some countries thrive despite corruption: 
The role of trust in the corruption-efficiency relationship. Review of 
International Political Economy, 17(1), 129-154.
Lin, Y. & Wu, L. (2014). Exploring the role of dynamic capabilities in firm 
performance under the resource-based view framework. Journal of 
Business Research, 67, 407–413. 
Lindell, M. K., & Whitney, D. J. (2001). Accounting for common method 
variance in cross-sectional research designs.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 86(1), 114-121.
Liu, C.-L. E. (2012). An investigation of relationship learning in cross-
border buyer–supplier relationships: The role of trust. International 
Business Review, 21, 311–327. 
Malinen, S., Wright, S., & Cammock, P. (2013). What drives organisational 
engagement? Evidence - Based HRM, 1(1), 96-108. 
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal 
system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 84, 123-136. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, C. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative 
model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 
709-734. 
Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M. B. (2005). Trust in management and 
performance: Who minds the shop while the employees watch the 
boss? Academy of Management Journal, 48(5), 874-888. 
McMillan, J. (2002). Reinventing the bazaar: A natural history of markets. 
New York: W.W. Norton.
Misangyi, V. F., Weaver, G. R., & Elms, H. (2008). Ending corruption: The 
interplay among institutional logics, resources, and institutional 
entrepreneurs. Academy of Management Review, 33(3), 750-770.
Mocan, N. (2008). What determines corruption? International evidence 
from microdata. Economic Inquiry, 46(4), 493-510. 
Morris, S. D. (2009). Political corruption in Mexico: The impact of 
democratization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Morris, S. D., & Klesner, J. L. (2010). Corruption and trust: Theoretical 
considerations and evidence from Mexico.  Comparative Political 
Studies, 43(10), 1258-1285.
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. (1985). Applied linear statistical 
models: Regression, analysis of variance, and experimental designs. 
Homewood, IL: Irwin.
North, D. (1991). Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 
97–112.
O’Higgins, E. R. E. (2006). Corruption, underdevelopment, and extractive 
resource industries: Addressing the vicious cycle. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 16, 235-254.
Park, H. (2003). Determinants of corruption: A cross-national analysis. 
Multinational Business Review, 11(2), 29-48. 
Parboteeah, K. P., Hoegl, M., & Cullen, J. B. (2008). Ethics and religion: 
An empirical test of a multidimensional model. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 80(2), 387-398.
Sánchez et al. / Estudios Gerenciales vol. 34, N° 147, 2018, 127-138138
Peña López, J. A., & Santos, J. M. S. (2014). Does corruption have social 
roots? The role of culture and social capital.  Journal of Business 
Ethics, 122(4), 697-708.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). 
Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review 
of the literature and recommended remedies.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 88(5), 879-903.
Porter, M. E. (1990). New global strategies for competitive advantage. 
Strategy and Leadership, 18(3), 4-14. 
Price, J. (2008). Public safety: The cost of living dangerously. In J. Haar & 
J. Price (Eds.), Can Latin America compete? Confronting the challenges 
of globalization (270-293). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Rivera-Batiz, F. L. (2001). International financial liberalization, corruption 
and economic growth. Review of International Economics, 9(4), 727-
737. 
Rodriguez, D., & Ehrichs, L. (2007). Global corruption report: Corruption 
in judicial systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press and 
Transparency International. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2002). “Grand” corruption and the ethics of global 
business. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(9), 1889-1918. 
Sabel, C. F. (1993). Studied trust: Building new forms of cooperation in a 
volatile economy. Human Relations, 46(9), 1133-1170. 
Schaefer, P. F., & Schaefer, P. C. (2008). Property, the rule of law, and 
development in the Americas. In J. Haar & J. Price (Eds.), Can Latin 
America compete? Confronting the challenges of globalization (197-
213). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Scott, R. W. (1995). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Steenkamp, J. E. M., & Baumgartner, H. (1998). Assessing measurement 
invariance in cross-national consumer research. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 25(1), 78-107.
Tan, H. H., & Lim, A. K. (2009). Trust in coworkers and trust in 
organizations. The Journal of Psychology, 143(1), 45-66.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and 
strategic management.  Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509-
533.
Transparency International. (2016). Corruption Perception Index 2016. 
Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/cpi2016/results. 
Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption 
from ten years of cross-national empirical research? Annual Review 
of Political Science, 10, 211-244.
Uslaner, E. M. (2004). Trust and corruption. In J. G. Lambsdorff, M. Taube, 
& M. Schramm (Eds.), The New Institutional Economics of Corruption 
(76-92). New York: Routledge. 
Uslaner, E. M. (2013). Trust and corruption revisited: How and why trust 
and corruption shape each other. Quality & Quantity, 47(6), 3603-3608.
Vanhala, M., Puumalainen, K., & Blomqvist, K. (2011). Impersonal trust: 
The development of the construct and the scale. Personnel Review, 
40(4), 485-513. 
Venard, B. (2009). Organizational isomorphism and corruption: An 
empirical research in Russia. Journal of Business Ethics, 89(1), 59-76. 
World Bank. (2016). Doing business 2016: Measuring regulatory quality and 
efficiency. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 
Wurgler, J. (2000). Financial markets and the allocation of capital. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 187-214. 
Yli-Renko, H., Autio, E., & Sapiencza, H. J. (2001). Social capital, knowledge 
acquisition, and knowledge exploitation in young technology-based 
firms. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6/7), 587-613.
Zhao, J. H., Kim, S. H., & Du, J. (2003). The impact of corruption and 
transparency on foreign direct investment: An empirical analysis. 
Management International Review, 43(1), 41-62.
